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Since the late 1980s, development economists
have become increasingly involved in the
field of conflict studies. An influential
literature has emerged which argues that
economic motives are the primary drivers of
contemporary civil wars. According to
econometric modelling, civil wars are
statistically most likely to occur in countries
with a high dependence on the export of
primary commodities, a high proportion of
poorly educated young men in the populace,
and slow economic growth (Collier 2000;
Collier and Hoffler 1998, 2001). The
argument is that young men are motivated
to rebel by the opportunity to predate on
lootable primary resources, and also by the
opportunity cost of not doing so. Greed,
rather than grievance, is regarded as the main
motivational force behind conflict. The so-
called ‘greed’ thesis has generated
considerable debate amongst social
scientists. A nascent ‘beyond greed and
grievance’ literature acknowledges the
importance of economic agendas in civil
wars, but widens the narrow analytical lens
of neoclassical economics to include
This article investigates the applicability of the influential
economics of civil war literature to the case of the conflict which
occurred in Solomon Islands between 1998 and 2003. It is argued
that a modified version of the greed thesis resonates with
particular aspects of the situation in Solomon Islands, particularly
during the latter phases of the conflict when a variety of actors,
including politicians, businessmen and ex-militants, were clearly
benefiting from the instrumentalisation of violence and disorder.
The underlying causes of the conflict have much to do with
historical patterns of uneven development which have created
overlapping boundaries of social-economic inequality and
ethnicity. As is the case with other recent armed conflicts in
Melanesia, issues of land, identity, ethnicity and socioeconomic
justice were central to the conflict.
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consideration of political, cultural and
historical factors and contexts (see Cramer
2002; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Pearce
2005). This emergent literature is also placing
small wars in the context of weak and failing
states, and wider processes of globalisation.
In this broadened perspective, state and
commercial actors are also viewed as
potentially important conflict actors.
The socioeconomic characteristics of
Solomon Islands, with its dependence on
primary commodity exports and its large
demographic youth bulge, make it an ideal
candidate for a greed-driven conflict or
‘resource war’. The objective of this article is
to examine the relevance of the economics of
civil war literature in the case of the recent
conflict in Solomon Islands.
This conflict commenced in late 1998,
when Guadalcanal militants, collectively
known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement
(IFM), set about a violent campaign of
harassment which saw the eviction of large
numbers of migrant settlers from their homes
on the Guadalcanal Plains and around
Honiara, most of whom originated from the
densely populated island of Malaita. A rival
militant group, the Malaita Eagle Force
(MEF), formed between late 1999 and early
2000. Comprising ex-policemen, men who
had been evicted from their homes on
Guadalcanal and so-called ‘angry young
men’ from the streets and settlements of
Honiara, the MEF formed a ‘Joint Operation’
with the paramilitary Police Field Force and,
in June 2000, staged a coup d’etat after raiding
the national armoury. Whilst the fighting
escalated dramatically after the coup, the
military-style armed conflict effectively
ended with the signing of the Townsville
Peace Agreement in October 2000. However,
the Agreement did not bring about peace as
low-level violence and lawlessness
continued to characterise various parts of the
country, particularly Honiara and the remote
Weather Coast of Guadalcanal, until the
deployment of the Australian-led Regional
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
(RAMSI) in July 2003.
It is argued that, with significant
modification, elements of the greed-driven
model of conflict resonate with particular
aspects of the conflict in Solomon Islands. A
range of actors, including ex-militants,
politicians and Honiara businessmen,
benefited financially from the violence and
disorder, particularly during the post coup
phase of the conflict. Much of the economic
gain flowed directly from government coffers
as a consequence of the pervasive corruption
of the compensation and demobilisation
processes. Under these circumstances, it is
the state, rather than ‘lootable’ primary
resources, which is the subject of predation.
However, the greed thesis cannot provide
a solely satisfactory explanation for the
origins and dynamics of the conflict in
Solomon Islands. The assumption that
individuals will always behave in a rational
and benefit-maximising way obscures
important social and cultural influences on
individuals’ motives for participating in
collective violence. The comparative regional
literature encourages us to see socioeconomic
inequality and ethnicity as potent drivers of
conflict in Melanesia,1 particularly in
situations where socioeconomic cleavages
coincide with the fluid and pliable
boundaries of ethnic identity. As has been
the case with the armed rebellions in Fiji and
Bougainville, it would appear that ethnicity
became polarised around underlying issues
of socioeconomic justice, particularly
concerning the distribution of the benefits of
development. Moreover, the largely
geographically based socioeconomic
inequalities which have developed between
and within groups in Solomon Islands have
roots stretching back to the early contact
period, and were further reinforced during
the British protectorate period. After the
Second World War, expressions of island and
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area-wide ethnic solidarities emerged as a
means to voice grievances concerning
perceived injustices at the hands of the
colonial administration. The list of grievances
has expanded since independence in 1978 to
include widespread dissatisfaction with post-
colonial governments, which have overseen
corruption, mismanagement and wastage,
particularly in the lucrative forestry sector,
and have failed to deliver services to the rural
populace.
Greed and grievance: neoclassical
economic models of intrastate
conflict
The ‘greed and grievance’ approach has been
developed by Paul Collier and his World
Bank colleagues who classify numerous
possible ‘causes’ of civil war under two broad
headings: ‘greed’, meaning the pursuit of
profit; and ‘grievance’, meaning the redress
of injustice (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001;
Collier 2000). They analysed data on internal
conflicts during the period from 1965 to 1999
against a range of economic, demographic
and socio-cultural variables to determine
which variables were most closely associated
with the occurrence of civil war. Their general
conclusion was that ‘objective grievances’,
such as inequality, political repression and
ethnic and linguistic divisions have little
bearing on the likelihood of the outbreak of
conflict. By contrast, ‘economic
characteristics’, particularly dependence on
primary export commodities, a high
proportion of poorly educated young men,
and slow economic growth, are powerful
predictors of civil war. The reasoning is that
rebel groups are motivated to wage war in
order to profit in a material sense through
the capture of lootable primary resources or
trade networks, a process described as
‘predation’. More recently, Collier and
Hoeffler (2001) have presented a weaker
formulation of the greed thesis, downplaying
the role of motive in favour of a focus on the
‘opportunity for rebellion’.
The work of Collier and his colleagues
resonates strongly with the ‘resource curse’
literature. Numerous studies suggest that
states that depend heavily on the export of
natural resources, particularly oil, gemstones
and minerals, tend to suffer from a variety of
conditions including slow economic growth,
high poverty rates, high levels of corruption
and authoritarian governments (see Ross
2004 for a summary of these studies). Other
studies, including those by Collier and his
colleagues, link at least one of these resource
curse conditions with the incidence of civil
war. Ross concludes that the ‘effect of natural
resource dependence on conflict may be part
of a larger phenomenon: the resource curse’
(Ross 2004:350).
The greed thesis also resonates with the
literature concerning the relationship
between youth bulges and conflict (see Urdal
2004). This literature, which is also
influential within World Bank policy and
research circles, sees demographic factors,
particularly the presence of large youth
cohorts, as the primary predictors of domestic
armed conflict. The risk of conflict is said to
increase when youth bulges occur in the
context of economic stagnation and limited
options for out-migration. However, as is the
case with the neoclassical economics models
of civil war, precise causal mechanisms
remain unclear.
While the youth bulge hypothesis in
general is supported by empirical
evidence, the ways that youth bulges
influence conflict propensity still
remain largely unexplored empirically
(Urdal 2004:16).
Two possible causal relationships are
proposed in the youth bulge literature. The
first focuses on unemployment, resulting
from oversupply in the labour market, as a
cause of grievance for young people.
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Grievances are intensified by the raised
expectations of youth brought about by
expanded educational opportunities and
their inability to influence or participate in
the political system. The second causal
relationship is Collier’s ‘opportunity for
rebellion’ model, which sees unemployment
as increasing the opportunity cost of not
rebelling. In other words, faced with no
option but unemployment and poverty,
young people are likely to seek income-
earning opportunities through participation
in rebellion. Whilst Collier sees close linkages
between poorly educated youth, unemploy-
ment and conflict, Urdal argues that higher
educational levels actually produce youth
grievances, particularly in developing
economies that are unable to absorb a rapid
increase in well-educated youth.2
Greed and grievance in Melanesia
The lexicon of greed and grievance has well
and truly entered the debate concerning the
causes  of armed conflict in Melanesia,
including Solomon Islands. Indeed the
socioeconomic characteristics of Solomon
Islands, West Papua, and Papua New Guinea
entice the application of the resource war
and greed-driven models of conflict.
Commentators are divided, however, as to
their relevance in the particular context of
Melanesia. For some economists, a modified
version of the greed thesis provides the best
model for explaining armed conflict
throughout the ‘arc of instability’.
The civil unrest derives from
competition for the natural resources
in an environment of weak states and
hence poorly designed and enforced
property rights, and moreover, the large
pool of under-employed provides
ample scope for the cre ation of
grievances to back up the claim for
resources (Duncan and Chand 2002:1).
For others, the greed thesis provides a largely
unsatisfactory explanation for particular
conflicts in Melanesia. Regan applies the
greed and grievance framework to the case
of the Bougainville conflict and finds it to be
inadequate in two key regards. First is the
fact that the motives of Francis Ona and the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)
could not be regarded as greed: ‘…the key
issue for Ona was socioeconomic justice’
(Regan 2003:156).3 Second is that, aside from
some looting of mine assets at the start of the
rebellion, the rebels did not ‘predate’ upon
the mine and mining wealth did not prolong
the conflict. Indeed, part of the rebel’s agenda
included permanent mine closure.4 Regan
finds that Ross’ (2003) hypothesis concerning
the relationship between separatist conflicts
and ‘unlootable’ natural resources is more
helpful in explaining the origins of the
Bougainville conflict
…the grievances of local people—both
landowners and semi-skilled mine
workers—to receive a ‘just’ share of the
mine revenue triggered acts of violence
that precipitated the conflict (Regan
2003:157).
Looking again at Melanesia more
broadly, Banks argues that whilst the
Melanesian countries ‘conform to at least
some of the explanations linking resources
and conflict’ the resource war models are
ultimately unhelpful (Banks 2005:188).
Building on research in anthropology and
human geography, mostly from Papua New
Guinea, Banks prefers to see resource
conflicts in Melanesia (defined as conflicts
which occur around resource developments,
particularly mines) as ‘more centrally about
the changes that occur in relationships
between individuals, groups and local
environments’ (Banks 2005:190). Four
particular processes are identified which
increase the potential for resource conflict to
occur. These relate to the relationship between
land and identity; the altering of regional
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notions of balance and association; the
disruptive social impacts of in-migration; and
intra-group conflict concerning distributional
issues (Banks 2005). All of these social and
cultural factors are clearly important in the
case of the conflict in Solomon Islands.
Greed and grievance in Solomon
Islands
The socioeconomic characteristics of
Solomon Islands are perfect for greed-driven
conflict. Primary resources, particularly raw
logs and fisheries, have accounted for 30–40
per cent of GDP since the early 1990s
(Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade 2004); and, in 1999, the time of the
most recent census, 41 per cent of the
population were under the age 15 (de Bruijin
2002). Several commentators have highlighted
the applicability of the economics of civil war
literature to the conflict in Solomon Islands.
McDougall, for example, rejects the import-
ance of economic agendas in the Bougainville
conflict, but finds that they were important
in the Solomon Islands’ case
…it is also clear that various
individuals and groups benefited from
the breakdown of the state in that
situation: rogue elements in the police,
certain businessmen and politicians,
local militia leaders such as Harold
Keke on the Weather Coast of
Guadalcanal (McDougall 2004:352).
Indeed, there is a strong consensus in the
academic literature on the conflict that
economic agendas were clearly evident in the
post-Townsville Peace Agreement phase of
the conflict (in particular, see Dinnen 2002;
Fraenkel 2004; Moore 2004). Ex-militants,
particularly from the MEF, became
indistinguishable from criminal gangs; and
both ex-militants and politicians benefited
from the abuse of the compensation and
demobilisation processes and had vested
interests in the prolongation of the
lawlessness and disorder. It is also known
that selected local business houses were
awarded duty remissions and tax
exemptions during this period (Dinnen 2002),
and it is alleged that the backroom dealings
also extended to the issuance of new logging
concessions to Asian companies.5 In these
circumstances, the state itself becomes a
lootable resource to be predated on by a range
of conflict actors.
Opinions differ concerning the motives
behind the coup of June 2000. Some regard it
as the outcome of then Prime Minister
Ulufa’alu’s failure to manage the situation
that had developed over the preceding 20
months or so, particularly in regard to
compensation, and his inability to ‘play the
political game’ more broadly. Others see the
coup as either an opportunist or
premeditated attempt to seize power for the
explicit purposes of economic gain. Chand
presents what he describes as a ‘stylised
model’ of the source and dynamics of the
conflict in Solomon Islands.
A genuine grievance seeds the process
of revolt that the authorities fail to
resolve. An opportunist capitalises on
the state’s oversight to muster support
and widen the grievance, often for
personal gain. It is important to note
that the opportunist is motivated
principally by greed but has strong
incentives to couch this in terms of the
grievance of the instigating group. The
dynamic takes its own path from here
on; the number and seriousness of the
grievances multiply with the support
base (Chand 2002:157).
Read in the broader context of Chand’s
discussion, one could reasonably assume
that ‘opportunist’ is intended to refer to those
who perpetrated the coup, ostensibly to seek
redress for the grievances of Malaitans who
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had been displaced from settlements on
Guadalcanal.6 Certainly it was those who
had been voted into the caretaker Sogavare
government (and their MEF backers)—in an
atmosphere of fear and intimidation—who
were the biggest winners in the compensation
saga.7 Furthermore, the Kemakeza govern-
ment, though legitimately elected,
nevertheless had strong connections with the
MEF and its members continue to be
implicated in illegal activities. Whether
regarded as conspiracy or opportunism, the
situation that ensued in the aftermath of the
coup lends weight to the thesis that it was
strongly motivated by economic, as well as
purely political, agendas.8 Another direct
outcome of the coup is that it returned to power
a group of politicians who had grown used to
the spoils of corruption in the forestry industry
for much of the 1980s and 1990s. Fraenkel
argues that it was these men who initiated
the MEF, whilst another politician, Ezekiel
Alebua, initiated the Isatabu militants.
Insurgent movements, such as the
Isatabu and Eagle forces, may have
attracted a groundswell of under-
employed youths from Guadalcanal
and Malaita, but both were initiated
by ex-national politicians who found
in them convenient new weapons to
deploy in their challenges to the
government of the day. In both cases,
the younger commanders and foot-
soldiers who had been summoned up
from the streets or villages soon became
deeply disenchanted when they saw
the fruits of their pyrrhic victories
(Fraenkel 2004:186).
According to the ‘opposition conspiracy’
thesis, the reformist Solomon Islands
Alliance for Change (SIAC) government
presented an unacceptable challenge to a
powerful coalition of vested interests,
including politicians, public servants, Asian
logging companies and criminals. Unable to
obtain numbers for a parliamentary vote of
no confidence, these vested interests sought
to stir up trouble on Guadalcanal in order to
create a situation in which a coup would be
seen as legitimate. According to Ulufa’alu,
the ‘militancy option’ had been in place since
the early 1990s, and would have been used
to depose then Prime Minister Billy Hilly in
1994 had he not been forced to resign as a
consequence of a number of defections from
his cabinet.9 From Ulufa’alu’s perspective,
militancy has for some time been regarded
by some elements within Solomon Island’s
state and society as a reserve option when
democratic processes fail.10
There would appear to be some merit to
this argument, at least as it relates to the coup.
Fry, reflecting on similarities between the
coups in Fiji and Solomon Islands, states
…in both coups we note the importance
of the middle class businessmen and
politicians whose personal wealth and
status are tied up with who controls the
state….In the Solomon Islands, as in
Fiji, the Ulufa’alu Government was
introducing anti-corruption regulations
which would upset established
business connections (Fry 2000:302).
Indeed, the SIAC Government’s Policy and
Structural Reform Program, a mix of home-
grown and donor-inspired initiatives, went
much further than tackling corruption
(Bennett 2000). The government reduced the
number of government ministries, down-
sized the public service by 10 per cent, and
implemented significant reforms in the long-
suffering forestry sector, including the
drafting of a new Forestry Act and the
establishment of a Forestry Board and a
Forestry Trust. These reforms
…would have not only reduced the
logging quota to a more sustainable
level, but also would have seen much
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Class, ethnicity, culture and history
Whilst economic agendas may explain some
aspects of the conflict in Solomon Islands,
there were clearly many other factors at play.
The causes of the original Isatabu uprising,
which saw the violent eviction of over 35,000,
mostly Malaitan, settlers from their homes
around Honiara and on the Guadalcanal
Plains, appear to have much to do with long-
standing and deep-seated grievances
concerning land, access to employment
opportunities, the distribution of the benefits
of development projects, and cultural
differences between settler and landowning
groups. Although there was widespread
looting and ransacking of abandoned houses
and government and commercial
infrastructure, no attempt was made to take
over the operation of the Gold Ridge mine,
nor the oil palm and cocoa plantations of the
Guadalcanal Plains.
Moreover, whilst it is easy to dismiss the
professed objectives of the MEF-backed coup,
people from Malaita have a long list of
grievances concerning their historical
isolation from development opportunities
and their mistreatment at the hands of both
colonial and post-colonial governments. The
situation on Guadalcanal is further
complicated by both intra and inter-group
conflict concerning land and the distribution
of the rents and royalties that flow from it.
Whilst many of these disputes would appear
to be motivated by greed, in the Melanesian
context they ‘are interpreted locally in terms
of traditional modes of distribution’ (Banks
2005:190). As argued by Regan (2003) in the
case of the Bougainville conflict, a central
issue for many involved in the Solomon
Islands conflict, particularly the young men
who swelled the ranks of both the IFM and
MEF, appears to be socioeconomic justice;
receiving a ‘fair’ share of the proceeds of
development, including better access to
services, especially education.
The fact that many of these perceived
socioeconomic injustices have occurred
between different ‘culture’ groups enabled
the conflict to take on a potent identity or
ethnic dimension such that at times it
resembled ‘a civil war…mainly between
Guadalcanal and Malaitan people’ (Bennett
2002:1). Indeed, many would argue that
conflict is most likely to occur in situations
where class and ethnic cleavages overlap
and reinforce one another. Larmour
(1994:68), for example, employs this
perspective in the case of the 1987 Fiji coups;
and Wesley-Smith and Ogan (1992) see the
coinciding boundaries of ethnicity, class and
age as an important cause of the Bougainville
conflict. Several commentators on the
Solomon Islands’ conflict regard ethnic
differences as having been polarised around
underlying economic inequalities, both real
and perceived.12
It is beyond the scope of this article to
present a detailed theoretical discussion of
the concepts of class and ethnicity, nor is it
the intention to review the often polemical
debate concerning the respective roles of class
and ethnicity as causes and drivers of
conflict in Melanesia. With regard to class, it
is suffice to say that Marxist accounts have
their limitations in the Pacific context due to
the continuing obscurity of societal and
cultural structures, and the importance of the
subsistence economy and customary forms
of land tenure, which raise doubts about the
central importance of the capitalist mode of
production assumed by Marxist scholars (see
Larmour 1992, 1994; Wesley-Smith and
Ogan 1992). However, the notion of class is
frequently synonymous with socioeconomic
inequalities and disparities, and in this
regard it remains a useful analytical concept.
With regard to ethnicity, few credible
scholars subscribe to the primordialism of
the populist ‘ancient hatreds’ perspective,
which has characterised media portrayals
of the conflict in Solomon Islands. However,
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whilst most informed observers would
regard ethnicity as more of a constructed—
rather than a primordial—factor in the
conflict, few attempt to situate their analyses
in the ‘constructionist’ or ‘soft’ perspective
of ethnic conflict directly (see Horowitz 1998
for a review of the typology). This perspective
regards ethnic affiliations as problematic,
malleable and easily manipulated: ‘they are
a convenient resource to be manipulated by
elites’ (de Soysa 2001:8). A notable exception
is Reilly (2005), who discusses the ways in
which identity construction has been a
central feature of the armed rebellions in Fiji,
Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.
Reilly also notes that ‘ethnic identities are
never static: indeed, they can be created to
serve particular goals and ends’ (2005:4).13
There could be much to be gained in more
closely examining the roles of socioeconomic
inequalities and ethnicity as drivers of
conflict in Solomon Islands. Judith Bennett’s
expansive history,  Wealth of the Solomons
(1987), traces the division of Solomon
Islanders into ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ as a
consequence of early contact with European
traders and the subsequent development and
labour policies of the colonial
administration. These historical inequalities
had a strong ecological and geographical
basis,
[b]ut some, especially in the eastern
Solomons, were disadvantaged
because their natural resources were
scant or because they were remote from
direct contact with traders. So anxious
were many of these for the new goods
that they traded years of their labour,
the only commodity they had that the
white man wanted (Bennett 1987:78).
In the early colonial period (from the
1900s to the 1920s) those areas with suitable
environments, notably the western islands
and the northeast plains of Guadalcanal,
were privileged by the colonial administra-
tion for the key economic activity of the day,
coconut plantation development. People
from areas which were deemed unsuitable
for plantation development, and which
offered minimal prospects for small-scale
cash cropping, had only one option for
participating in the ‘new’ economy: to
temporarily leave their homes in order their
sell their labour on the plantations (Bennett
1987). Honiara was chosen as the new site
for the capital after the Second World War
because of its proximity to the Guadalcanal
Plains, which were regarded as vastly more
suitable for agricultural development projects
than the environments of Tulagi and
neighbouring islands in the Florida group
(Bennett 2002:6). This area became
…a magnet for people seeking work
and the majority were Malaitan—first
for the large rice-growing projects of
the 1960s and then the CDC oil palm
project and small industries such as
breweries and sawmills (Bennett
2002:13).
From 1997 until its closure during the
conflict, the Gold Ridge mine to the east of
Honiara was also a significant source of
employment opportunities (Dinnen 2000).
The heavily populated island of Malaita
has historically been one the most
disadvantaged parts of Solomon Islands. Of
the 30,000 or so Solomon Islanders who were
recruited between 1870 and 1910 to work on
the sugarcane plantations of Queensland,
Fiji and Samoa, and in the nickel mines of
New Caledonia, more than 50 per cent came
from Malaita (Corris 1973; Price with Baker
1976:2). The Weather Coast of Guadalcanal
also shares many of the historical economic
disadvantages of Malaita. Both places were
isolated from the early trading and pre war
plantation economies, leaving their
populations no choice but to sell their labour
during the blackbirding era and,
subsequently, on plantations in other parts
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of Solomon Islands. Similarly, after the War,
large numbers of men from south
Guadalcanal, as well as Malaita, went to
work in and around Honiara and on the
Guadalcanal Plains (Bennett 1987). As was
the case with Malaitan migrants, these
movements became increasingly permanent
over the past 30 years or so.
This history of uneven development
created a complex matrix of economic
cleavages operating both between and within
groups and at local and national levels. The
history of settlement, land transactions,
employment and economic activity on the
Guadalcanal Plains is widely regarded as
having created divisions between settler and
landowner groups and also within
landowning groups.14 However, there are also
broader inequalities at play. Following Frazer
(1997a, 1997b) and Scales (2004), a
fundamental distinction can be made between
the ‘Honiara élite’ and the vast majority of the
population (around 85 per cent) who reside
in rural areas (and also those who live in
Honiara but are unemployed or hold poorly
paid jobs). The urban élite consists of public
servants, businessmen, professionals and,
perhaps most importantly, national Members
of Parliament. Contributions by Frazer (1997a,
1997b), Kabutaulaka (1997), Dauvergne
(1998a, 1998b) and Bennett (2000) have
documented the deepening collusion between
foreign-owned logging companies and
corrupt politicians, which has seen the over-
exploitation of Solomon Islands’ lucrative
forestry resources over the past 20 years or so
to the benefit of a miniscule Honiara-based
élite.15 Moreover, as Scales demonstrates in the
case of Western Province, the logging industry
has also produced cleavages at the local level
…a cross-cutting stratification and
fractionation of island society that
drives the political emergence of new
associations for island resources
governance (2004:4).
After the Second World War, perceptions
of socioeconomic inequality and neglect by
the colonial administration fuelled the
creation of island and area-wide ethnic
solidarities. The Maasina Rule movement
which emerged on Malaita immediately after
the War rapidly expanded to include an
estimated 96 per cent of Malaitans (Keesing
1982:359). A fundamental objective of the
movement was to ‘codify an agreed version
of Malaitan kastom which the administration
would have to accept as legitimate’ (Keesing
1982:360). Another objective was to represent
the interests of all Malaitans through
‘collective bargaining’ with the colonial
government in regard to ‘the terms of
administration, plantation labour and law’
(Keesing 1982:359). Frazer’s (1990) analysis
of Maasina Rule argues that it was concerned
not only with anti-colonial nationalist
objectives, but also with posing a ‘working
class’ challenge to the inequities of the
colonial plantation economy.
Similarly, the Moro movement—which
appeared on the Weather Coast in the late
1950s—was formed in response to feelings
of isolation and economic disadvantage
brought about by years of neglect by the
central government; frustrations that were
compounded by the relative proximity of the
region to Honiara. The movement’s agenda
was to seek ‘a new order based on local self-
sufficiency and a revival of old customs’
(Bennett 1987:316). The recent conflict in the
Solomon Islands also witnessed the re-
emergence of a dormant secessionist
movement in Western Province—where
much of the commercial logging has taken
place—which, according to Scales, had much
to do with the distribution of the economic
benefits of logging (2004).
Indeed, the recent conflict has also
highlighted the ongoing influence of both the
Maasina Rule and Moro movements.
Commentators have drawn continuities
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between the cultist and millenarianist
aspects of these movements and the
behaviour and apparel of militant groups
during the conflict (Herlihy 2003; Moore
2004). It is these motivations, more than any
other, which defy the rationality of economic
models of conflict. According to Herlihy,
[r]itual and cultist activity during the
crisis, of the more traditional type, was
reported from both sides. Father Terry
Brown, Bishop of Malaita, reported
that there was certainly cultic activity
by the IFM. Many of their fighters wore
traditional Guadalcanal kabalato (loin
cloths) and a traditional string around
the neck (like the Moro Movement).
They used various forms of magic to
make themselves immune from
gunfire…There was certainly some
cultic activity by MEF—some use of
traditional sacrifice, magic, etc. The
founder of the phallus-worshipping
‘Only You’ sect in Honiara in the
eighties joined the MEF and was said
to collect Guadalcanal skulls for his
shrine in bush above Honiara. He
displayed some in the Auki market
(Herlihy 2003:25–26).
Conclusion
It would appear that a modified version of
the greed thesis of intrastate conflict has
some resonances with particular aspects of
the conflict in Solomon Islands. It has been
seen that a range of actors benefited
financially from the corruption and
criminality that characterised the post coup
phase of the conflict. Moreover, it seems likely
that economic agendas were a motivating
force behind the coup itself. While there are
allegations of illegal logging and the
improper granting of logging concessions
during the course of the conflict, the economic
predation was predominantly on the state
itself, particularly through the corrupted
compensation process. The post coup
situation has been described by some
commentators as akin to the ‘instrumentalis-
ation of disorder’, which characterises
conflict in certain African contexts (Dinnen
2002; Fraenkel 2004). This perspective sees
political élites and their armed clients as
having a vested economic interest in the
promulgation and prolongation of violence
and disorder.
However, it has also been argued that
economic factors alone cannot fully account
for the origins and dynamics of the conflict.
The reasons individuals participate in
collective violence cannot be reduced to mere
greed and economic self-interest. In the case
of the conflict in Solomon Islands, class and
ethnicity are influences which transcend the
‘myth of rational choice individualism’ and
inform the ‘social and historical features of
change’ highlighted in the ‘beyond greed and
grievance’ literature (Cramer 2002:1,857). As
has been the case with other recent armed
conflicts in Melanesia, ethnicity or identity
became polarised around underlying issues
of socioeconomic justice, both real and
perceived.
To understand the ways in which these
inequalities and identities have developed
we must look into the history of Solomon
Islands from the early contact period.
Ecological and geographic expediencies
meant that particular parts of the archipelago
were privileged first by the early European
traders and later by the development policies
of the colonial administration. Two of the
areas that are central to the conflict, the island
of Malaita and the Weather Coast of
Guadalcanal, are perhaps the most
underdeveloped and historically neglected
parts of Solomon Islands. In the post war
period, people from these and other areas
repeatedly voiced their grievances at what
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they regarded as injustices at the hands of
both colonial and post-colonial governments,
particularly in regard to the distribution of
the benefits of development. These
grievances have been compounded by the
emergence of an élitist post-colonial political
culture, which, for the most part, has been
closely associated with the notoriously
corrupt logging industry. While the militant
groups quickly fractured after the Townsville
Peace Agreement, and struggled to maintain
cohesion even before then, the conflict in
Solomon Islands was nevertheless
characterised by a polarisation of ethnic
identities along a confrontational ‘us versus
them’ axis.
There is considerable scope for further
analysis of the causes and dynamics of the
conflict in Solomon Islands. An important
issue that has not been discussed here is the
‘demonstration effect’ of the Bougainville
conflict. Over 9,000 people from Bougainville
came into the Solomon Islands during the
course of the Bougainville conflict (1988–98),
with most of them settling on Guadalcanal
for long periods of time. Kabutaulaka argues
that the Bougainvilleans would have shared
with the Guadalcanal people their story of
evicting the ‘hated “redskins” (PNG
Highlanders)’ from their island and shutting
down one of the world’s largest copper mines
(2001:17). One wonders how these stories
affected the motivations of the young Isatabu
militants. Indeed, the voices of the young men
who swelled the ranks of both the IFM and
MEF remain conspicuously absent in the
academic discourse on the conflict. This is
unfortunate because it is, after all, the greed
of men such as these that is said to drive
violent conflict in developing nations
throughout the world.
Notes
1 Whilst acknowledging the difficulties inherent
in attempting to identify ‘culture areas’,
following Knauft (1999:1), Melanesia is
delineated as the region stretching from New
Caledonia in the southeast to the island of
New Guinea in the northwest. Included are
the post-colonial nations of Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji,
the French colony of New Caledonia and the
Indonesian province of West Papua.
2 In the case of Solomon Islands, it appears
that both processes are at work (see Fraenkel
2004:184). In the mid 1990s, limited secondary
school places meant that 6,000–7,500 students
per year left the education system at the
primary school level. Moreover, whilst 1,000–
1,500 secondary school graduates were
entering the labour market each year, the
number of new jobs was only expanding at
around 700 per year. However, there are
other possible sources of rising youth
expectations that are thought to be important
in the case of Solomon Islands. Ted Gurr
discusses these as ‘demonstration effects’
(1970:92). Most are the consequence of the
increasing exposure of non-Western peoples
to the material culture of the West as a result
of modernisation, urbanisation and internal
migration. According to Gurr, ‘…exposure
to modernisation raises expectations for
welfare and interpersonal values—economic
goods, personal development, status, the
pleasures of urban social life. The
demonstration effect also operates with
respect to power values’ (1970:97).
3 In an earlier article, Regan gives greater
emphasis to the role of criminal motives
amongst elements of the BRA:‘The strongest
support came from frustrated young men
with few economic opportunities for whom
membership of the BRA gave power and
status. There was considerable continuity
between criminal activity by raskols and BRA
activity’ (Regan 1998:277).
4 This has led Ware (2004) to refer to the
Bougainville conflict as ‘the only green civil
war’ and one that therefore cannot be
explained through the use of econometric
GREED AND GRIEVANCE
67
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 20 Number 2 August 2005  © Asia Pacific Press
models. Unfortunately, Ware restricts her
exploration of the youth bulge thesis in the
Pacific to the Bougainville conflict (because
she does not see the Solomon Islands case as
qualifying as an armed conflict).
5 During the period of the conflict the
production and export of all primary export
commodities declined but, proportionately,
log exports declined the least and recovered
the most rapidly (Central Bank of Solomon
Islands 2005). In 2003, the value of log exports
exceeded pre-conflict levels, which lends
some weight to allegations that several new
logging concessions were awarded after the
coup in ‘back-door’ dealings (Seminar
presented by Bartholomew Ulufa’alu at The
Australian National University, 15 July 2004;
taped interview with B. Ulufa’alu, 25 July
2004; personal communication, Tony Jansen,
10 September 2004). It has also been alleged
that illegal logging activities increased during
the period of the conflict (UNDP 2004).
6 Alternatively, the opportunist could be
Ezekiel Alebua who was the Premier of
Guadalcanal Province when the troubles
began in late 1998. Whilst Alebua’s
involvement in the origins of the violence
remains unclear, it is alleged by some,
including Weather Coast militants, that he
almost single-handedly orchestrated the
uprising. According to Fraenkel: ‘A more
plausible conspiracy theory—backed, for
example, by Police Commissioner Frank
Short—was that Guadalcanal provincial
leaders, and in particular Guadalcanal
premier Ezekiel Alebua, had planned the
rural eviction campaign together with key
GRA militant leaders, including Harold Keke
and Joe Sangu, at a meeting held at the
Tambea Resort in March 1998’ (2004:64).
7 Note, however, that the Sogavare
government’s ‘chequebook approach to
peace making’ saw the dispensation of
‘compensation’ payments to provincial and
militant representatives from both Malaita
and Guadalcanal (Dinnen 2002:289). Similarly,
numerous parties benefited from the ‘peace
dividend’ of the Townsville Peace Accord in
October 2000, including Guadalcanal militants
and politicians, Marau fighters (representing
the Are’are speaking peoples of Marau Sound
in eastern Guadalcanal, whose ancestors
originated from Malaita) and the MEF
Supreme Command (Fraenkel 2004b:105).
However, again it was the political and
militant elements of the MEF who benefited
the most from the Townsville Peace Accord:
‘Its provisions reflected the interests of the
militant groups above all else and, in
particular, those of the more powerful MEF
and its political and business associates’
(Dinnen 2002:291).
8 According to Fraenkel, ‘the coup was less
about capturing state power and more about
ransacking the state’ [original emphases]
(2004:106).
9 Like the SIAC government, Francis Billy
Hilly’s National Coalition Partnership (NCP)
was attempting to reform the long-suffering
forestry industry, which had become so
corrupted under the governments of
Solomon Mamaloni (for details of the
reforms see Frazer 1997a, 1997b; Dauvergne
1998, 1998/99; Bennett 2000). The NCP barely
had a chance to implement the reform
program before it was brought down by a
series of cabinet resignations and defections
in October 1994. It was later proven that five
cabinet ministers of the NCP government
had defected to join Mamaloni’s Solomon
Islands National Unity and Reconciliation
Party (SINURP) after receiving bribes from
a Honiara businessman  (Kabutaulaka
1997:488). Once in office, the SINURP
government immediately set about
dismantling the reform program and it was
quickly back to business as usual for
Mamaloni, who was the director of a logging
company, and his ministers, most of whom
were also involved in the logging industry
(Frazer 1997a, 1997b).
10  Seminar presented at the Australian National
University, 15 July 2004; taped interview with
B. Ulufa’alu, 25 July 2004.
11 The present status of the reform of the
forestry sector is unclear. Ulufa’alu alleges
that Asian logging companies actually
expanded their logging concession areas
during the ‘crisis’ (taped interview); and it
appears that the new Forestry Act is yet to
be debated by Parliament.
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12 Fry presents the perspective that the
democratic system had been ‘captured by
middlemen…who could manipulate the
system for their own interests but whose
interests were served by playing on ethnic
division’ (2000:300–1). Reilly (2005) finds a
similar process, which he calls ‘identity
construction’, at play in the Bougainville
conflict and the Fiji coups, as well as in the
Solomon Island’s conflict.
13 Measuring ethnic diversity is problematic.
Reilly (2005) employs language as a readily
quantifiable measure, which can be used for
comparative purposes in the South Pacific
context. Following this logic, there are at least
seven languages spoken on Guadalcanal and
ten on Malaita, with a total of more than 80
across the whole of the archipelago (Wurm
and Hattori 1981, cited in Dinnen 2002:285).
However, the true number of ethnic groups
is arguably greater than this as many of the
languages have multiple dialects and, at least
in pre-contact times, different groups sharing
the same the language lacked ‘political
cohesion’ and were frequently ‘at odds with
one another’ (Bennett 1987:6).
14 This history is examined in some depth by
Fraenkel (2004). The internecine conflict
referred to here is intergenerational conflict
within Guadalcanal landowning groups. The
present generation of young men feel that,
in selling land rights to settlers, their fathers
squandered their inheritance (see Kabutalaka
2002). This situation is reminiscent of the
origins of the Bougainville conflict (as
observed by Dinnen 2002), where inter-
generational disputes within Nasioi
landowning groups concerning royalty
payments from the Panguna mine are
thought to have sparked the initial violence
(Filer 1990; Regan 1998, 2003). Another
important dispute on Guadalcanal concerns
the claims of Weather Coast people as the
‘true true’ landowners of all of Guadalcanal.
According to Brown, ‘customary land
ownership of the [Gold Ridge] mine is still
disputed…with Weather Coast people
continuing to exert their claims’ (2003:4).
15 Frazer characterises the nature of the logging
industry since independence in 1978 as ‘a
barely controlled form of mining sanctioned
by a section of the ruling élite for their own
benefit and in the short-term interests of the
post-colonial state’ (1997a:318).
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